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dc.contributor.author
Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique
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dc.date.available
2019-05-02T16:29:48Z
dc.date.issued
2017-09
dc.identifier.citation
Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique; The fragility of our moral standing to blame; Peeters Publishers; Ethical Perspectives; 24; 3; 9-2017; 333-361
dc.identifier.issn
1370-0049
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/75412
dc.description.abstract
The question I address in this article is why, and under what conditions, a person can lose her moral standing to blame others for their actions. I defend two related claims. The first is that blaming is justifiable in fewer cases than we might expect. This conclusion depends on my second claim: Our moral standing (or authority) to blame is more resistant to moral luck than moral responsibility (or blameworthiness) is often assumed to be. I consider different kinds of loss of standing to blame and focus on a specific kind: What has been called (and I will call) tu quoque arguments ('you have no moral standing to blame me because you did the same'). Then I focus on the relationship between some specific cases of tu quoque and moral luck (and, more precisely, circumstantial moral luck). I.defend the claim that the success of the tu quoque argument (and the corresponding loss of moral standing) is immune to moral circumstantial luck. From this claim I try to follow a number of considerations oriented to establishing the scope of moral standing and suggest a unifying view that accounts for my previous analysis and, at the same time, rescues some features of our commonsensical practice.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Peeters Publishers
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
Circumstantial Luck
dc.subject
Moral Blame
dc.subject
Moral Luck
dc.subject
Moral Responsibility
dc.subject
Moral Standing
dc.subject.classification
Estudios Religiosos
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dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Ética y Religión
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dc.subject.classification
HUMANIDADES
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dc.title
The fragility of our moral standing to blame
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2019-04-29T14:04:04Z
dc.identifier.eissn
1783-1431
dc.journal.volume
24
dc.journal.number
3
dc.journal.pagination
333-361
dc.journal.pais
Bélgica
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dc.description.fil
Fil: Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Ethical Perspectives
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3248535&journal_code=EP
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.24.3.3248535
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