Capítulo de Libro

Why must Organized Beings be Thought in Teleological Terms? On Kant´s Justification of the Teleological Judgment

Lerussi, Natalia Andrea Icon

Otros responsables

Fecha

2018

Editorial

Springer

Revista

Título del libro

Teleologische Reflexion in Kants Philosophie

Nombre del evento

Fecha del evento

Institución organizadora

ISSN

eISSN

ISBN

978-3-658-23693-9

Idioma

Inglés

Tipo del evento

Resumen

In the paper I discuss Kant’s justification for judging organized beings (or organisms) in teleological terms, through the concept of the “end” or “natural end”. Nowadays there are different answers to this question. For instance, from the perspective of what I call the “objective point of view”, organized beings have some objective characteristics that justify us having to comprehend them teleologically, while from that of what I call the “ordinary subjective viewpoint”, we must do so only on account of the discursive character of our understanding. I argue that both positions are, for different reasons that I outline, misleading, and I offer my own answer, a refined subjective position. By means of the distinction between the “essential character” of our understanding, on the one hand, and its “limits”, on the other, I hope to give a consistent answer to the question why organized beings must be judged teleologically and one that is well-supported in the sources.

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