La inteligibilidad e intelección de las ideas divinas según la perspectiva de Juan Duns Escoto

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Fecha
05/2020
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Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos
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Filosofia Unisinos
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1519-5023
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1984-8234
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El tema de las ideas divinas ha sido un tópico abordado por los maestros escolásticos en el contexto de la teoría sobre la creación del mundo. En este artículo analizamos el abordaje de Juan Duns Escoto y la originalidad de su propuesta. En efecto, el pensador escocés rechaza la explicación en boga a finales del siglo XIII que establecía relaciones de razón en la esencia divina para conocer de modo necesario las diferentes ideas a partir de las cuales la voluntad divina se determina a crear. En su propuesta, desarrolla una nueva concepción del modo en que Dios conoce las posibles imitaciones de su esencia. En efecto, para el Doctor Sutil, Dios conoce en un primer instante de naturaleza su propia esencia y en un segundo instante ?produce? las cosas según un esse intelligibile específico. Las ideas divinas son, por tanto, un objeto secundario que terminan el único acto eterno de intelección, pero no poseen un esse propio sino que representan el contenido informativo de ese acto. Esta teoría ha sido problematizada por los discípulos de Escoto, quienes intentan responder cuál es el origen de la inteligibilidad de esas ideas, cuestión que abordaremos para brindar una solución ad mentem Scoti.
The topic about divine ideas has been addressed by the scholastic masters in the context of the world creation theory. In this article we analyze the approach of John Duns Scotus and the originality of his proposal. Indeed, the Scottish thinker rejects the most commonly used explanation by the end of the XIII century, which established relations of reason in the divine essence to know, in a necessary way, different ideas from which the divine will is determined to create. In his proposal, he develops a new perception of how God knows the possible imitations of his essence. In fact, according to the Subtle Doctor, God knows his own essence at a first instant of nature and in a second instant he “produces” the creatable things according to a specific esse intelligibile. Divine ideas are, therefore, a secondary object that terminates the only eternal act of intellection, not having their own esse, but representing the information content of the act. This theory has been discussed by the disciples of Scotus, who try to find out what is the origin of the intelligibility of those ideas. We will address these issue to provide a solution ad mentem Scoti.
The topic about divine ideas has been addressed by the scholastic masters in the context of the world creation theory. In this article we analyze the approach of John Duns Scotus and the originality of his proposal. Indeed, the Scottish thinker rejects the most commonly used explanation by the end of the XIII century, which established relations of reason in the divine essence to know, in a necessary way, different ideas from which the divine will is determined to create. In his proposal, he develops a new perception of how God knows the possible imitations of his essence. In fact, according to the Subtle Doctor, God knows his own essence at a first instant of nature and in a second instant he “produces” the creatable things according to a specific esse intelligibile. Divine ideas are, therefore, a secondary object that terminates the only eternal act of intellection, not having their own esse, but representing the information content of the act. This theory has been discussed by the disciples of Scotus, who try to find out what is the origin of the intelligibility of those ideas. We will address these issue to provide a solution ad mentem Scoti.
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