Popperian animals and instrumental reasoning

Abstract

According to Daniel Dennett, some non-human animals are “Popperian creatures” who possess internal representational models that allow them to simulate different responses offline, evaluate their consequences, and discard bad options in advance. There are, however, some discrepancies, both in Dennett’s writings and those of his critics, regarding what animals can be classified as Popperian. While some defend a very inclusive view, which counts all mammals and even some invertebrates as Popperian animals, others think that humans might be the only animals qualifying as such. This disagreement suggests significant discrepancies in understanding what it means to be a Popperian creature. In light of such disputes, in this paper, I aim to clarify which cognitive abilities should be considered critical to being a Popperian animal. Based on that analysis, I then focus on a specific cognitive ability – instrumental or means-end reasoning – and argue that possessing it suffices to count as a Popperian animal in a robust understanding of this notion. Finally, I discuss some empirical evidence and argue, based on it, that at least some non-human animals – the most compelling evidence coming from great apes and New Caledonian crows – count as genuine instrumental reasoners and, therefore, also as genuine Popperian creatures.