¿Normatividad primitiva en primates no humanos?

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05/2024
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Universidad de Salamanca
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Artefactos
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1989-3612
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1989-3612
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Para una extensa tradición filosófica, la normatividad es un rasgo exclusivo de la especie humana. Recientemente, sin embargo, algunos filósofos y científicos comenzaron a explorar la posibilidad de atribuir algún tipo de normatividad a otras especies. Frans de Waal se destaca, en este contexto, por haber proporcionado un amplio repertorio de evidencia empírica sobre comportamientos de primates no humanos que parecen ajustarse a distintos tipos de normas. Los escépticos sobre la normatividad animal suelen, sin embargo, cuestionar este tipo de evidencia, brindando explicaciones alternativas, no normativas, de ella. Un modo en que los escépticos podrían justificar esta estrategia es apelando al llamado Canon de Morgan y aduciendo que las explicaciones no normativas introducen procesos psicológicos más simples que las normativas. Ahora bien, cuán atractiva resulte esta línea argumentativa dependerá de cómo se entienda la sensibilidad normativa. Si en lugar de centrarnos en las caracterizaciones más demandantes de tal sensibilidad adoptamos la hipótesis de que algunos primates no humanos cuentan con una suerte de “normatividad primitiva” (Ginsborg, 2011; 2018), podremos elaborar explicaciones de (al menos parte de) la evidencia empírica proporcionada por de Waal, que rivalizan con las que ofrecen los escépticos en la simplicidad de los procesos cognitivos que invocan.
According to a long philosophical tradition, normativity is an exclusive feature of human animals. However, in the last decades, many philosophers and scientists have begun to explore the possibility of attributing some kind of normativity to other species. Frans de Waal stands out among them for providing a rich repertoire of empirical evidence suggesting that non-human primates behave normatively. Skeptics regarding animal normativity usually question this kind of evidence by offering non-normative explanations of it. Here I suggest that skeptics may justify this preference for non-normative explanations by claiming that they invoke simpler cognitive processes than those who posit some sensitivity to norms (as demanded by Morgan’s Canon). However, I will argue that how compelling this strategy turns out to be will depend on how one understands normative sensitivity. More specifically, I will suggest that we should abandon the most demanding characterizations of normative sensitivity in the literature and adopt the hypothesis that non-human primates may have some kind of “primitive normativity” (Ginsborg, 2011; 2018). Doing this will allow us to elaborate explanations of (some) empirical evidence provided by de Waal that may end up being as simple as those elaborated by the sceptics.
According to a long philosophical tradition, normativity is an exclusive feature of human animals. However, in the last decades, many philosophers and scientists have begun to explore the possibility of attributing some kind of normativity to other species. Frans de Waal stands out among them for providing a rich repertoire of empirical evidence suggesting that non-human primates behave normatively. Skeptics regarding animal normativity usually question this kind of evidence by offering non-normative explanations of it. Here I suggest that skeptics may justify this preference for non-normative explanations by claiming that they invoke simpler cognitive processes than those who posit some sensitivity to norms (as demanded by Morgan’s Canon). However, I will argue that how compelling this strategy turns out to be will depend on how one understands normative sensitivity. More specifically, I will suggest that we should abandon the most demanding characterizations of normative sensitivity in the literature and adopt the hypothesis that non-human primates may have some kind of “primitive normativity” (Ginsborg, 2011; 2018). Doing this will allow us to elaborate explanations of (some) empirical evidence provided by de Waal that may end up being as simple as those elaborated by the sceptics.
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