John Locke: los racionales, las bestias y la resistencia

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Fecha
06/2021
Editorial
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
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Bajo Palabra
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1576-3935
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1887-505X
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Español
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En los Dos tratados sobre el gobierno civil, Locke distingue a las asociaciones de las sociedades políticas. Solo en las sociedades políticas existen una ley común, una judicatura a la que apelar con autoridad para decidir entre las controversias y un poder colectivo suficiente para castigar a los infractores. Al hacer esta distinción, Locke pareciera afirmar que la sociedad política subsiste mientras cesen los conflictos naturales, pero también, y no menos importante, que no hay verdaderos vínculos políticos hasta que tales disputas no cesan. Dicho de otro modo, el ámbito político lockeano aparece vaciado de conflictividad. Locke recurre en dicho “vaciamiento” a diversas figuras (el ladrón, el animal, el testarudo, el descontento alborotador, el tirano) para despolitizar los conflictos remanentes o ulteriores sobre las normas comunes. En todas ellas subyace la identificación de lo racional con lo político y con lo humano. En el artículo se propone un análisis de los límites de tales exclusiones, pero de forma interna a la teoría lockeana.
In the Two Treatises on Civil Government, Locke distinguishes associations from political societies. Only in political societies exist a common law, a judiciary to appeal to with authority to decide between disputes, and enough collective power to punish offenders. In making this distinction, Locke seems to assert that political society subsists as long as natural conflicts cease, but also, and not least, that there are no true political ties until such disputes cease. In other words, the Lockean political field appears emptied of conflict. In this “emptying”, Locke resorts to various figures (the thief, the animal, the raving mad-man, the heady malcontent, the tyrant) to depoliticize the remaining or subsequent conflicts about common norms. In all of them lies the identification of the rational with the political and with the human. The article proposes an analysis of the limits of such exclusions, but internal to Lockean theory.
In the Two Treatises on Civil Government, Locke distinguishes associations from political societies. Only in political societies exist a common law, a judiciary to appeal to with authority to decide between disputes, and enough collective power to punish offenders. In making this distinction, Locke seems to assert that political society subsists as long as natural conflicts cease, but also, and not least, that there are no true political ties until such disputes cease. In other words, the Lockean political field appears emptied of conflict. In this “emptying”, Locke resorts to various figures (the thief, the animal, the raving mad-man, the heady malcontent, the tyrant) to depoliticize the remaining or subsequent conflicts about common norms. In all of them lies the identification of the rational with the political and with the human. The article proposes an analysis of the limits of such exclusions, but internal to Lockean theory.
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