Acordemos que estamos en desacuerdo: estrategias partidarias en las elecciones primarias argentinas

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Fecha
05/2024
Editorial
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Ecuador
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1390-1249
eISSN
1390-8065
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Español
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Resumen
Desde 2004 hasta la actualidad 11 provincias argentinas tuvieron leyes de elecciones primarias, abiertas, simultáneas y obligatorias (PASO) y las aplicaron al menos una vez. Su creación buscó democratizar la selección de candidaturas a partir de incorporar elecciones primarias obligatorias para los partidos políticos y para el electorado. Esta herramienta fue criticada debido a que los partidos políticos priorizaron el acuerdo de listas únicas, cumpliendo con la obligatoriedad de la norma, pero incumpliendo su objetivo principal. En este artículo se indaga en los factores que inciden en las estrategias de acuerdos o disputas en los partidos políticos y sus alianzas a partir de la medición de la cantidad de listas internas presentadas en las PASO. Para llevar a cabo el análisis se realizó un estudio observacional analizando las estrategias de las principales fuerzas partidarias en 11 provincias argentinas. Se estudiaron tres variables políticoinstitucionales: la reelección del gobernador o de la gobernadora; el calendario electoral; y el oficialismo vs. la oposición. Los resultados arrojaron que cuando el gobernador o la gobernadora no compite por la reelección y el calendario electoral provincial se encuentra desdoblado del nacional, son mayores las probabilidades de disputa interna entre más de una lista. Asimismo, formar parte de la oposición no constituye un factor determinante para tener una disputa interna entre dos o más listas en las PASO.
From 2004 to the present, eleven Argentine provinces have had laws on Mandatory Open Simultaneous Primaries (PASO, in Spanish) and have enforced them at least once. Their creation sought to democratize the selection of candidates through mandatory primary elections for political parties and voters. The PASO law has been criticized because political parties come to agreements on single lists of candidates, complying with the mandatory rule but avoiding internal competition. This paper investigates the factors that have influenced the strategies of agreement or dispute within political spaces, based on the measurement of the number of internal lists presented in PASO. To carry out the analysis, an observational study was conducted by examining the strategies of the main political forces in eleven Argentine provinces. Three political-institutional variables were studied: 1) the re-election of the governor, 2) the electoral calendar, and 3) government vs. opposition. The results show that when the governor does not run for re-election and the electoral calendar is split, there are greater chances of internal dispute between more than one list. Likewise, being part of the opposition was not a determining factor for the dispute between two or more internal lists.
From 2004 to the present, eleven Argentine provinces have had laws on Mandatory Open Simultaneous Primaries (PASO, in Spanish) and have enforced them at least once. Their creation sought to democratize the selection of candidates through mandatory primary elections for political parties and voters. The PASO law has been criticized because political parties come to agreements on single lists of candidates, complying with the mandatory rule but avoiding internal competition. This paper investigates the factors that have influenced the strategies of agreement or dispute within political spaces, based on the measurement of the number of internal lists presented in PASO. To carry out the analysis, an observational study was conducted by examining the strategies of the main political forces in eleven Argentine provinces. Three political-institutional variables were studied: 1) the re-election of the governor, 2) the electoral calendar, and 3) government vs. opposition. The results show that when the governor does not run for re-election and the electoral calendar is split, there are greater chances of internal dispute between more than one list. Likewise, being part of the opposition was not a determining factor for the dispute between two or more internal lists.
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