The Causal Structure of Emotions in Aristotle: Hylomorphism, Causal Interaction between Mind and Body, and Intentionality

Abstract

Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has beenput forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction betweensoul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point andbasic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this readingonly takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of themare included into the picture, then a causal interaction of mind and body remains withinAristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylomorphism is understood.Beyond the discussion with this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfoldcausal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for acomprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. Through the differentcauses Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon ofemotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intentional object.