The method and object of legal theory according to Cristina Redondo

Abstract

In ‘Internal’ Legal Positivism, Cristina Redondo attempts to articulate the metatheoretical presuppositions of an approach directed to the study of law that explains its specific normative character. In doing so, she argues for, among others, two main theses: (i) legal norms necessarily constitute reasons in a formal sense, regardless of the substantive correctness of the content they express; (ii) legal theory can be morally neutral with respect to its object. This means that, according to Redondo, it is possible to formulate purely descriptive statements that refer to the content of law; that is, it is possible to formulate them from a point of view that does not presuppose the acceptance of that content. The expression "´internal´ legal positivism" is the terminology chosen by Redondo to account for the type of methodological approach necessary for a positivist theory of law à la Hart to be possible. In this article, I will summarize the main theses defended by the author in her book and trace the central questions that have been at the heart of the discussion at the Symposium on ‘Internal’ Legal Positivism published in this journal.