Medieval and Renaissance Skepticism

Abstract

It is at present widely acknowledged among historians of Western philosophy that the Renaissance was a key period for both the recovery of ancient skeptical texts and the revitalization of the Western skeptical tradition. There has been much less recognition that skeptical problems and arguments were discussed fairly extensively in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. The limited awareness of the role of skepticism in medieval philosophy partially explains why historical scholarship on this topic is still scarce compared to that devoted to skepticism in ancient, Renaissance, or modern philosophy. The situation has started to change, though, particularly in the last few years.1 And fortunately so, since the widespread ignorance of the part played by skepticism during the Middle Ages has prevented most scholars from realizing that medieval discussions of various forms of epistemological skepticism must be taken into account in order to fully understand the history of Renaissance and modern skepticism. For instance, new light is shed on Descartes’s evil genius and deceiving god arguments, and their differences, when one becomes aware that the question of the possibility of divine deception and the question of the extent of this deception in comparison to that of the devil were topics of considerable discussion among medieval theologians and philosophers.2 Given this background, in Descartes’s time the mere reference to deception by an evil demon or by God vividly evoked in his interlocutors and readers a topic with a long and rich history of philosophico-theological debates. But leaving aside this instrumental value, medieval discussions of skepticism—particularly skepticism about our knowledge of the nature and existence of the external world—may be of intrinsic philosophical interest to, for example, those present-day epistemologists concerned with understanding and refuting skepticism...