The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds

Abstract

This chapter critically assesses the prevailing position in legal theory, which analyses legal norms as a kind of reason for action from the perspective of moral philosophy. The assessment focuses on how the dominant positions in this debate explain reasons for action in general, as well as the specific capacity of law to constitute reasons for action. The background to the prevailing conception is based, among other things, on a unitary conception of practical reasoning that locates the fundamental source of justificatory power in morality. In doing so, it also assumes a particular conception of morality. In the first part of this contribution, I use Bernard Williams's perspective to critique both the peculiar conception of morality held by the current position and its conception of reasons and rational justification. Building on this, I aim to advance a critique of the equation between what is justified and what one ought to do morally. Following these reflections on morality and rational justification, the second part of the chapter returns to the debate about the conditions under which law can justify decisions. In this regard, I emphasise in what sense the law's connection with morality can be relevant to justifying actions, and in what sense it is completely irrelevant. In light of Williams's thoughts on morality and reasons, I demonstrate that law can provide a distinct set of reasons that are not necessarily subordinate to morality. More specifically, with reference to cases of conflict between legal reasons, I highlight that it is also possible to reject the widely accepted idea that one must always act for an undefeated reason. In this regard, I argue that an appropriate account of reasons enables one to assert that, just as in the moral sphere, within the legal sphere, in cases of conflict between reasons, one can be justified in doing something that is required by defeated reasons.