Is Skeptical Inquiry Possible?

Abstract

There are distinct kinds of radical skeptic. Among them, one may count the following two: The skeptic who reports lacking all beliefs except those concerning the various ways he is appeared to, and the skeptic who reports lacking any belief whatsoever, even about his own phenomenology. The question I would like to address in this chapter is whether inquiry is feasible for these two kinds of radical skeptic. More precisely, can they engage in truth-directed inquiry in a way that is consistent with their skepticism? Do they not believe that it is possible to discover the truth about the matters under investigation and that doing so is objectively valuable? Do they not believe that there is a correct way to conduct an inquiry? Are they not doxastically committed, overtly or tacitly, to certain norms of inquiry? Does inquiry not necessarily imply understanding and, if so, does such understanding not presuppose holding certain beliefs? Does any inquirer not need to use his cognitive capacities and explicitly or implicitly believe that they are reliable? In sum, are the radical skeptics in question not forced to admit, malgré eux, that they hold beliefs of various kinds?.