Locke on Conditional Threats | ||
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universidad Nacional de Quilmes | |
| dc.contributor.author | Venezia, Luciano Javier | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-12 | |
| dc.description.abstract | John Locke says that a victim is permitted to kill a Conditional Threat in self-defense. Yet, David Rodin argues that killing is disproportionate to the harm averted and is therefore impermissible. But Rodin mischaracterizes the situation faced by a Conditional Threat victim as analyzed by Locke. In this article, I aim to provide a more satisfactory reading of Locke on self-defense against Conditional Threats, particularly of the thesis that killing involves a proportionate response to the harm averted. In addition to this, I also aim to further elaborate and defend Locke's view. First, I show that a Conditional Threat deprives his victim of her freedom to act as she thinks fit, without having to depend on the Conditional Threat's arbitrary will. Second, I argue that an interest in not being deprived of one's freedom to act as one thinks fit, without having to depend on another person's arbitrary will, by a conditional threat of deadly harm, is of sufficient value to make killing a proportionate act, especially if the person is highly morally culpable. If killing also meets the necessity condition of justified self-defense (admittedly, a big “if”), it follows that Locke, not Rodin, holds the correct view. | es |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Venezia, Luciano Javier. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Quilmes; Argentina | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | es |
| dc.identifier.citation | Venezia, Luciano Javier; Locke on Conditional Threats; John Wiley & Sons; Southern Journal of Philosophy; 60; 4; 12-2022; 696-713 | es |
| dc.identifier.institucional | CONICET | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2041-6962 | es |
| dc.identifier.repo | CONICET Digital | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/202034 | |
| dc.journal.ciudad | Nueva Jersey | es |
| dc.journal.number | 4 | es |
| dc.journal.pagination | 696-713 | es |
| dc.journal.pais | Estados Unidos | es |
| dc.journal.title | Southern Journal of Philosophy | es |
| dc.journal.volume | 60 | es |
| dc.language.iso | eng | es |
| dc.publisher | John Wiley & Sons | es |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12460 | |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12460 | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess | |
| dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR) | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ | * |
| dc.subject | LOCKE | es |
| dc.subject | CONDITIONAL THREATS | es |
| dc.subject | PROPORTIONALITY | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Otras Filosofía, Étnica y Religión | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Filosofía, Ética y Religión | es |
| dc.subject.classification | HUMANIDADES | es |
| dc.title | Locke on Conditional Threats | es |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
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