Normas, razones y motivaciones

Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to analyze how Moreso examines the connection between reasons, norms, and motivation of behavior. To a large extent, Moreso's approach, outlined in various chapters in his book Lo normativo: variedades y variaciones, depends on the acceptance of the Kantian principle ‘ought implies can’. This principle is widely accepted in the logic of norms, though in the field of law, it generates philosophically controversial consequences. For example, it follows that an incoherent set of norms could not exist within the same normative corpus. An independent yet intrinsically connected argument was developed by Ricardo Caracciolo, suggesting that from certain intuitive theses regarding norms, the motivation behind behavior, and reasons for action, it would follow that we are not obligated to perform actions for which we lack the desire to undertake. In this paper, I attempt to show that Moreso's arguments for addressing this dilemma proposed by Caracciolo need further development.