¿Es la psicología empírica, según Kant, una ciencia de la naturaleza?: Una evaluación crítica del comentario de Patrick R. Frierson

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11/2020
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones
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Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia
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2525-1198
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En su interesante "Kant´s Empirical Psychology" (2014), Partrick R. Frierson intenta mostrar que, para Kant, la psicología empírica es una ciencia natural que contiene leyes naturales causales. El objetivo de este artículo es exponer y criticar concisamente el intento mencionado. Las tres tesis principales de nuestra exposición crítica pueden resumirse de la siguiente manera: 1) dado que la categoría de causalidad no puede aplicarse en el dominio del sentido interno, que es el campo de estudio de la psicología empírica, no es posible establecer leyes causales en el dominio en cuestión; 2) si fuese posible formular tales leyes, ellas no podrían ponerse a prueba, porque no es posible manipular los fenómenos internos a fin de realizar experimentos con ellos; 3) aunque, de acuerdo con Kant, su antropología pragmática es una ciencia, esto no implica que la psicología empírica, disciplina con cuyo enfoque está vinculada la primera, sea igualmente una ciencia.
In his interesting Kant’s Empirical Psychology (2014), Patrick R. Frierson attempts to show that, for Kant, empirical psychology is a natural science that contains natural causal laws. The aim of this paper is to concisely expound and criticize such attempt. The three main theses of our critical exposition can be summarized as follows: 1) given that the category of causality cannot be applied in the strict sense in the domain of inner sense, which is the field of study of empirical psychology, it is not possible to establish causal laws in the domain in question; 2) if it were somehow possible to formulate such laws, they could not be tested, because it is not possible to manipulate inner phenomena in order to carry out experiments with them; 3) although, according to Kant, his pragmatic anthropology is a science, this does not imply that empirical psychology, discipline with whose approach the former is related, is likewise a science.
In his interesting Kant’s Empirical Psychology (2014), Patrick R. Frierson attempts to show that, for Kant, empirical psychology is a natural science that contains natural causal laws. The aim of this paper is to concisely expound and criticize such attempt. The three main theses of our critical exposition can be summarized as follows: 1) given that the category of causality cannot be applied in the strict sense in the domain of inner sense, which is the field of study of empirical psychology, it is not possible to establish causal laws in the domain in question; 2) if it were somehow possible to formulate such laws, they could not be tested, because it is not possible to manipulate inner phenomena in order to carry out experiments with them; 3) although, according to Kant, his pragmatic anthropology is a science, this does not imply that empirical psychology, discipline with whose approach the former is related, is likewise a science.
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