An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit | ||
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universidad de Girona | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universidad de Vigo | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi" | |
| dc.contributor.author | Berga, Dolors | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bergantiños, Gustavo | |
| dc.contributor.author | Jordi, Massó Carreras | |
| dc.contributor.author | Neme, Alejandro José | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-03 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game. | es |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Berga, Dolors. Universidad de Girona; España | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | es |
| dc.identifier.citation | Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit; Elsevier; Mathematical Social Sciences; 54; 2; 3-2007; 152-175 | es |
| dc.identifier.institucional | CONICET | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4896 | es |
| dc.identifier.repo | CONICET Digital | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/135139 | |
| dc.journal.number | 2 | es |
| dc.journal.pagination | 152-175 | es |
| dc.journal.pais | Estados Unidos | es |
| dc.journal.title | Mathematical Social Sciences | es |
| dc.journal.volume | 54 | es |
| dc.language.iso | eng | es |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | es |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004 | |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165489607000261?via%3Dihub | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | * |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ | * |
| dc.subject | VOTING | es |
| dc.subject | COMMITTEES | es |
| dc.subject | UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemática Aplicada | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemáticas | es |
| dc.subject.classification | CIENCIAS NATURALES Y EXACTAS | es |
| dc.title | An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit | es |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
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