Controversias empíricas y filosóficas alrededor de la falacia de la conjunción

Otros responsables
Fecha
12/2011
Editorial
Universodad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades
Revista
Cuadernos del Sur. Filosofía
Título del libro
Nombre del evento
Fecha del evento
Institución organizadora
ISSN
2362-2989
eISSN
2362-2989
ISBN
Idioma
Español
Tipo del evento
Clasificación temática
Palabras clave
Resumen
Tversky y Kahneman (1983) mostraron que la gente, en ciertos contextos, tiende a pensar que una conjunción de eventos es más probable que uno de los eventos involucrados (“falacia de la conjunción”). A raíz de tal descubrimiento han surgido debates importantes en psicología y filosofía. Algunos sostienen que se trata de un error de razonamiento. Otros defienden que es el producto de un malentendido del problema por parte de los participantes. Sin embargo, para poder resolver este debate es necesario dirimir ciertas controversias de carácter empírico, a saber, sobre los factores que tienen influencia sobre la falacia de la conjunción. Un problema es que en la literatura se reportan resultados aparentemente opuestos. Un segundo problema tiene que ver con que se suele estudiar la influencia de cada factor de manera aislada, dejando de lado la interacción de los distintos factores. Proveeré un análisis de la literatura sobre estos temas y reportaré los resultados de un experimento realizado con el Dr. Douglas Wedell que busca arrojar luz sobre estas controversias. Argumentaré que nuestros resultados empíricos apoyan la tesis de que la falacia de la conjunción no se debe a un malentendido del problema por parte de los participantes.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events is more likely to occur than one of the events involved (a phenomenon called “conjunction fallacy”). As a consequence, researchers in psychology and philosophy engaged in heated debates around this phenomenon. Some researchers hold the view that the conjunction fallacy is a reasoning mistake, while others think that it is just a misunderstanding of the problem by participants. In order to solve this debate, we need first to clarify and solve some empirical controversies about factors that influence the conjunction fallacy. The main problem is that the empirical studies on the issue seem to show conflicting results. Furthermore, there are important research gaps regarding the interaction of some factors that need to be filled. I review the relevant literature that deal with these empirical aspects. Then I report the results of an experimental study that Dr. Wedell and I ran together. This experiment aims to solve some of the problems found in the literature of the area. It will also provide evidence for the claim that the conjunction fallacy is not mainly due to people’s misunderstanding of the problem.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events is more likely to occur than one of the events involved (a phenomenon called “conjunction fallacy”). As a consequence, researchers in psychology and philosophy engaged in heated debates around this phenomenon. Some researchers hold the view that the conjunction fallacy is a reasoning mistake, while others think that it is just a misunderstanding of the problem by participants. In order to solve this debate, we need first to clarify and solve some empirical controversies about factors that influence the conjunction fallacy. The main problem is that the empirical studies on the issue seem to show conflicting results. Furthermore, there are important research gaps regarding the interaction of some factors that need to be filled. I review the relevant literature that deal with these empirical aspects. Then I report the results of an experimental study that Dr. Wedell and I ran together. This experiment aims to solve some of the problems found in the literature of the area. It will also provide evidence for the claim that the conjunction fallacy is not mainly due to people’s misunderstanding of the problem.
Colecciones
Aprobación
Revisión
Complementado por
Referenciado por
Licencia Creative Commons
Excepto donde se indique lo contrario, la licencia de este ítem se describe como by-nc-sa
