Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend | ||
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Université Pierre et Marie Curie | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Université de Grenoble I | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía | |
| dc.contributor.author | Nadal, J. P. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Gordon, M. B. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Iglesias, J. R. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Semeshenko, Viktoriya | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-10 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We introduce a general framework for modelling the dynamics of the propensity to offend in a population of (possibly interacting) agents. We consider that each agent has an honesty index which parameterizes his probability of abiding by the law. This probability also depends on a composite parameter associated to the attractiveness of the crime outcome and of the crime setting (the context which makes a crime more or less likely to occur, such as the presence or not of a guardian). Within this framework we explore some consequences of the working hypothesis that punishment has a deterrent effect, assuming that, after a criminal act, an agent's honesty index may increase if he is caught and decrease otherwise. We provide both analytical and numerical results. We show that in the space of parameters characterizing the probability of punishment, there are two phases: one corresponding to a population with a low crime rate and the other to a population with a large crime rate. We speculate on the possible existence of a self-organized state in which, due to the society reaction against crime activities, the population dynamics would be stabilized on the critical line, leading to a wide distribution of propensities to offend in the population. In view of empirical works on the causes of the recent evolution of crime rates in developed countries, we discuss how changes of socio-economic conditions may affect the model parameters, and hence the crime rate in the population. We suggest possible extensions of the model that will allow us to take into account more realistic features. | es |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Nadal, J. P.. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Francia. Université Pierre et Marie Curie; Francia | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Gordon, M. B.. Université de Grenoble I; Francia | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Iglesias, J. R.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; Argentina | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | es |
| dc.identifier.citation | Nadal, J. P.; Gordon, M. B.; Iglesias, J. R.; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend; Cambridge University Press; European Journal Of Applied Mathematics; 21; 4-5; 10-2010; 421-440 | es |
| dc.identifier.institucional | CONICET | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0956-7925 | es |
| dc.identifier.repo | CONICET Digital | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/189105 | |
| dc.journal.ciudad | Cambridge | es |
| dc.journal.number | 4-5 | es |
| dc.journal.pagination | 421-440 | es |
| dc.journal.pais | Reino Unido | es |
| dc.journal.title | European Journal Of Applied Mathematics | es |
| dc.journal.volume | 21 | es |
| dc.language.iso | eng | es |
| dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | es |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-applied-mathematics/article/abs/modelling-the-individual-and-collective-dynamics-of-the-propensity-to-offend/874B0A9FF3BBAC7678FFF01000036F8E | |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956792510000173 | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | * |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ | * |
| dc.subject | CRIME AND PUNISHMENT | es |
| dc.subject | ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINALITY | es |
| dc.subject | EQUILIBRIA | es |
| dc.subject | PHASE TRANSITION | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemática Aplicada | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemáticas | es |
| dc.subject.classification | CIENCIAS NATURALES Y EXACTAS | es |
| dc.title | Modelling the individual and collective dynamics of the propensity to offend | es |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
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