Esencia, definición y la tesis de identidad en Aristóteles, Metaphysica Z 4-6

Abstract

To clarify Aristotle´s Identity Thesis in Metaphysics Z 6, according to which each strictly definable item must be identical to its own essence (1031 a 15-16, 1032 a 4-6), I show that it is a simple corollary of some logical theorems drawn from the Organon, which have a direct impact on Z 4´s explanation that identity is based on the possession of essence. As I claim, Z 6´s innovation consists of a clarification about substance as that which -because of having essence- can fulfill the identity-condition. Therefore, Z 6´s argument targets principally non-Identity as a consequence of Platonic separation. Further, I argue against the commonly held view that the Identity Thesis stands on the hylomorphism of Z´s later chapters.