Una reivindicación de los experimentos cruciales

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Fecha
03/2015
Editorial
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Revista
Revista de Filosofía
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ISSN
0034-8244
eISSN
1988-284X
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Español
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Resumen
En este artículo reviso la crítica de Pierre Duhem a los experimentos cruciales y reivindico la existencia de esta clase de experimentos. Luego, estudio los experimentos de Fizeau y Foucault de 1850 y critico la interpretación que Duhem hizo de estos resultados experimentales. Argumento que el resultado de un experimento crucial siempre puede describirse en términos neutrales respecto de las teorías rivales en disputa. Por esta razón, dichos resultados experimentales son relativamente estables y pueden ser reinterpretados en nuevos contextos teóricos. Finalmente, distingo los experimentos cruciales exitosos, aquellos que confirman una teoría dada y disconfirman a sus rivales, de los experimentos decisivos. Los primeros permiten confirmar una teoría y disconfirmar a sus rivales, pero no necesariamente proporcionan razones suficientes para aceptar o rechazar una de tales teorías.
in this paper i assess Pierre Duhem’s criticism of crucial experiments, and argue that we have reasons to vindicate their existence. i then analize the experiments carried out by Fizeau and Foucault in 1850, and criticize Duhem’s interpretation of their results. i contend that the results of crucial experiences can be described in terms that are neutral with respect to the competing theories. For that reason an experimental result is relatively stable and open to different interpretations in the light of new theories. i conclude by distinguishing successful crucial experiments from decisive experiments. The former are meant to provide evidence that confirms one theory and disconfirms its rivals, but not necessarily to provide sufficient reasons for accepting or rejecting one of those theories.
in this paper i assess Pierre Duhem’s criticism of crucial experiments, and argue that we have reasons to vindicate their existence. i then analize the experiments carried out by Fizeau and Foucault in 1850, and criticize Duhem’s interpretation of their results. i contend that the results of crucial experiences can be described in terms that are neutral with respect to the competing theories. For that reason an experimental result is relatively stable and open to different interpretations in the light of new theories. i conclude by distinguishing successful crucial experiments from decisive experiments. The former are meant to provide evidence that confirms one theory and disconfirms its rivals, but not necessarily to provide sufficient reasons for accepting or rejecting one of those theories.
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