Igual libertad: Cuerpo y espacio de aparición en Hannah Arendt y Judith Butler

Otros responsables
Fecha
11/2018
Editorial
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani
Revista
Anacronismo e Irrupción
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2250-4982
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Español
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Resumen
En sus últimos trabajos, Judith Butler ha regresado, una y otra vez, a las ideas arendtianas de “espacio de aparición” y de “derecho a tener derechos”. Este retorno nunca se hizo de modo acrítico, de todos modos. El distanciamiento se funda en la crítica de una Arendt que suele ser leída como la autora de una separación extrema e inmodificable tanto entre lo público y lo privado como entre el cuerpo en su relación con el mundo de la necesidad y el cuerpo en su relación con la libertad. El doble movimiento que Butler realiza es, de todos modos, particular: éste va de la recuperación de las nociones de espacio de aparición y de derecho a tener derechos como imprescindibles para comprender las formas contemporáneas de la opresión, al rechazo de las tajantes distinciones arendtianas entre espacio y cuerpo privados y públicos. A partir de este doble movimiento, y en paralelo con una lectura del Merleau-Ponty de la reversibilidad de los cuerpos y del espacio intercorporal, es que Butler propone un modelo novedoso de concepción y de defensa de lo que aquí llamaremos “igual libertad”.
In her most recent works, Judith Butler has returned, again and again, to Hannah Arendt’s ideas of the “space of appearance” and the “right to have rights”. This return was never acritical, however. The distancing is rooted in a critique of an Arendt that is usually read as the author of an extreme and unmodifiable separation between both the public and the private and the body in its relation to the world of necessity and the body in its relation to freedom. Butler’s double movement is, nevertheless, particular: it goes from a recovering of the notions of the space of appearance and the right to have rights as crucial in any attempt to understand contemporary forms of oppression, to the rejection of those strict Arendtian distinctions between space and body private and public. It is from the starting point of this double movement, and in parallel with a reading of the Merleau-Ponty of the reversibility of bodies and the intercorporeal space, that Butler promotes a novel model for the thinking and defense of what here we call “equal freedom”.
In her most recent works, Judith Butler has returned, again and again, to Hannah Arendt’s ideas of the “space of appearance” and the “right to have rights”. This return was never acritical, however. The distancing is rooted in a critique of an Arendt that is usually read as the author of an extreme and unmodifiable separation between both the public and the private and the body in its relation to the world of necessity and the body in its relation to freedom. Butler’s double movement is, nevertheless, particular: it goes from a recovering of the notions of the space of appearance and the right to have rights as crucial in any attempt to understand contemporary forms of oppression, to the rejection of those strict Arendtian distinctions between space and body private and public. It is from the starting point of this double movement, and in parallel with a reading of the Merleau-Ponty of the reversibility of bodies and the intercorporeal space, that Butler promotes a novel model for the thinking and defense of what here we call “equal freedom”.
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