On Exiting After Voting | ||
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universidad de Girona | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universidad de Vigo | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona | |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi" | |
| dc.contributor.author | Berga, D. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bergantiños, G. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Massó, Javier | |
| dc.contributor.author | Neme, Alejandro José | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006-12 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit behavior of members after knowing the chosen alternative. For the case of monotonic preferences we propose, for each chosen alternative, an unambiguous and meaningful prediction of the subset of members that will exit. | es |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Berga, D.. Universidad de Girona; España | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Bergantiños, G.. Universidad de Vigo; España | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Massó, Javier. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España | |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | es |
| dc.identifier.citation | Berga, D.; Bergantiños, G.; Massó, Javier; Neme, Alejandro José; On Exiting After Voting; Springer Heidelberg; International Journal Of Game Theory; 34; 1; 12-2006; 33-54 | es |
| dc.identifier.institucional | CONICET | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0020-7276 | es |
| dc.identifier.repo | CONICET Digital | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/272958 | |
| dc.journal.ciudad | Heidelberg | es |
| dc.journal.number | 1 | es |
| dc.journal.pagination | 33-54 | es |
| dc.journal.pais | Alemania | es |
| dc.journal.title | International Journal Of Game Theory | es |
| dc.journal.volume | 34 | es |
| dc.language.iso | eng | es |
| dc.publisher | Springer Heidelberg | es |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2 | |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2 | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess | * |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ | * |
| dc.subject | VOTING | es |
| dc.subject | EXIT | es |
| dc.subject | SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemática Aplicada | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemáticas | es |
| dc.subject.classification | CIENCIAS NATURALES Y EXACTAS | es |
| dc.title | On Exiting After Voting | es |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
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