Delitos de odio: ¿Prueba del estado mental de los perpetradores o expresión de repugnancia de los evaluadores?

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Fecha
12/2024
Editorial
Universidad de Talca
Revista
Política Criminal
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0718-3399
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Español
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En este trabajo analizaremos tres enfoques diferentes para fundamentar los delitos de odio. Mostraremos que la familia de fundamentación objetivista, paradójicamente, priva al odio de toda relevancia normativa en cuanto al aumento de pena, otorgándole una dudosa relevancia probatoria. Sostendremos que la concepción expresiva convierte a los delitos de odio en delitos odiosos, lo que proporciona una visión distorsionada de la atribución de responsabilidad, consistente en centrar el aumento de la pena no en la emoción que impulsa al delincuente, sino en el efecto emocional que su acción provoca en la comunidad. Concluiremos que el odio que impulsa la acción del agente debe ser entendido como el factor normativamente justificante del aumento de reproche y, por lo tanto, como un factor empírico susceptible de prueba en cada caso.
Despite the evident social relevance of hate crimes, there are profound disagreements regarding the most appropriate way to explain their nature and justify their punishment. In this paper, we will analyse three different approaches to justifying hate crimes. We will demonstrate that the objectivist view, paradoxically, strips hate of any normative relevance concerning the enhancement of penalties, conferring upon it a dubious form of probative relevance. We will argue that the expressive view transforms hate crimes into heinous crimes, providing a distorted view of the attribution of responsibility. This distortion entails shifting the focus of the punishment enhancement not on the agent’s emotion but on the emotional impact their action has on the community. We will conclude that the hate driving the agent's action must be understood as the normatively justifying factor for the increased reproach and, consequently, as an element subject to proof in each case.
Despite the evident social relevance of hate crimes, there are profound disagreements regarding the most appropriate way to explain their nature and justify their punishment. In this paper, we will analyse three different approaches to justifying hate crimes. We will demonstrate that the objectivist view, paradoxically, strips hate of any normative relevance concerning the enhancement of penalties, conferring upon it a dubious form of probative relevance. We will argue that the expressive view transforms hate crimes into heinous crimes, providing a distorted view of the attribution of responsibility. This distortion entails shifting the focus of the punishment enhancement not on the agent’s emotion but on the emotional impact their action has on the community. We will conclude that the hate driving the agent's action must be understood as the normatively justifying factor for the increased reproach and, consequently, as an element subject to proof in each case.
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