Subordinated hedonic games | ||
| dc.conicet.organizacion | ORGANIZACIONES | es |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis | es |
| dc.conicet.organizacion | ORGANIZACIONES | es |
| dc.contributor.author | Cesco, Juan Carlos | es |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-05 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model. | es |
| dc.description.fil | Fil: Cesco, Juan Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina; | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | es |
| dc.identifier.citation | Cesco, Juan Carlos; Subordinated hedonic games; Hindawi Publishing Corporation; Game Theory; 2013; 5-2013; 10 | es |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2314-6559 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/1077 | |
| dc.journal.pagination | 10 | es |
| dc.journal.pais | Egipto | es |
| dc.journal.title | Game Theory | es |
| dc.journal.volume | 2013 | es |
| dc.language.iso | eng | es |
| dc.publisher | Hindawi Publishing Corporation | es |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.hindawi.com/journals/gt/2013/512742/ | |
| dc.relation.alternativeid | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/5 | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | * |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ | es |
| dc.subject | Hedonic Games | es |
| dc.subject | Core Partitions | es |
| dc.subject | Distributions | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Ciencias Naturales y Exactas | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemáticas | es |
| dc.subject.classification | Matemática Aplicada | es |
| dc.title | Subordinated hedonic games | es |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |