Reconfiguring policy advisory systems under crisis: the role of bureaucratic discretion and reputation in Argentina and Brazil

Abstract

Why do policy advisory systems (PAS) respond so differently to crises? Structural explanations, mostly derived from consolidated democracies, offer only a partial account because they overlook how advisory authority is reconfigured under political pressure in contexts where expertise is weakly institutionalized.To address this gap, this article examines how advisory authority is constructed and contested in politically contentious environments. It shifts attention from structural features to the role of key actors in shaping advisory processes. Among these actors, health regulatory agencies are relevant given their position at the interface between scientific validation and political decision-making. Yet, even when they share similar levels of international recognition, they may occupy different roles—remaining central in some cases while being bypassed in others.Drawing on a comparative analysis of health PAS during the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil and Argentina, we argue that this variation reflects the interaction between bureaucratic discretion and bureaucratic reputation, shaped by agencies’ positions within domestic and transnational expert networks. In Brazil, ANVISA combined greater discretion, strong network connections, and a solid reputation, enabling it to remain central even under politicized conditions and to produce a more centripetal configuration. In contrast, in Argentina, ANMAT operated with limited discretion in weaker, fragmented networks, which undermined its reputational authority and increased its vulnerability to politicization, resulting in a more centrifugal configuration.This article advances an actor-centered explanation of advisory authority in contexts of weakly institutionalized expertise, showing how variation in discretion and reputation shapes agencies’ capacity to remain central under crisis conditions.