Earning but Not Leading: Argentina's Economic Elites and the Exercise of Power in Global Capitalism

Abstract

Since the 1970s, Argentina’s growth has stalled compared to other Latin American nations, yet the country continues to stand out as one of the most equal in the region. This configuration has been attributed to weaker elites facing a mobilized civil society. This chapter questions this hypothesis and examines the composition and power of economic elites in Argentina. On the one hand, considering a detailed description of the country’s economic activities, corporations, and business leaders shows the dislocation between structural and instrumental business power. While big companies, especially those that export grains, remain the most competitive and profitable in the global market but lack strong political influence, small and middle-sized companies – most oriented toward the domestic market – are more cohesive and organized, with strong ties to the political realm. On the other hand, an analysis of long-term economic and social trends shows that instability provoked a profound transformation of economic elites. At the same time, moderate growth increased social inequalities, and poverty climbed and stayed high for the last five decades. Therefore, the relationship between Argentina’s economic elites and political authorities is much more complex than a zero-sum game in which social unrest forces business owners to cede and negotiate. Local unpredictability combined with financialization produced diverse effects. One of them is the consolidation of escape mechanisms that encourage the search for easy profits as well as capital outflow, preventing long-term investments and growth. Besides structural differences, most business owners privileged short-term advantages rather than collective efforts to forge a sustainable economic order.