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Artículo

Do not fear your opponent: Suboptimal changes of a prevention strategy when facing stronger opponents

Fernandez Slezak, DiegoIcon ; Sigman, MarianoIcon
Fecha de publicación: 08/2012
Editorial: American Psychological Association
Revista: Journal Of Experimental Psychology-general
ISSN: 0096-3445
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de recurso: Artículo publicado

Resumen

The time spent making a decision and its quality define a widely studied trade-off. Some models suggest that the time spent is set to optimize reward, as verified empirically in simple-decision making experiments. However, in a more complex perspective compromising components of regulation focus, ambitions, fear, risk and social variables, adjustment of the speed-accuracy trade-off may not be optimal. Specifically, regulatory focus theory shows that people can be set in a promotion mode, where focus is on seeking to approach a desired state (to win), or in a prevention mode, focusing to avoid undesired states (not to lose). In promotion, people are eager to take risks increasing speed and decreasing accuracy. In prevention, strategic vigilance increases, decreasing speed and improving accuracy. When time and accuracy have to be compromised, one can ask which of these 2 strategies optimizes reward, leading to optimal performance. This is investigated here in a unique experimental environment. Decision making is studied in rapid-chess (180 s per game), in which the goal of a player is to mate the opponent in a finite amount of time or, alternatively, time-out of the opponent with sufficient material to mate. In different games, players face strong and weak opponents. It was observed that (a) players adopt a more conservative strategy when facing strong opponents, with slower and more accurate moves, and (b) this strategy is suboptimal: Players increase their winning likelihood against strong opponents using the policy they adopt when confronting opponents with similar strength. © 2011 American Psychological Association.
Palabras clave: Adaptation , Chess , Decision Making , Response Time , Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente descripción: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/56090
URL: http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2011-23445-001
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025761
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Articulos(IFIBA)
Articulos de INST.DE FISICA DE BUENOS AIRES
Citación
Fernandez Slezak, Diego; Sigman, Mariano; Do not fear your opponent: Suboptimal changes of a prevention strategy when facing stronger opponents; American Psychological Association; Journal Of Experimental Psychology-general; 141; 3; 8-2012; 527-538
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