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dc.contributor.author
Fernandez Slezak, Diego  
dc.contributor.author
Sigman, Mariano  
dc.date.available
2018-08-17T14:49:39Z  
dc.date.issued
2012-08  
dc.identifier.citation
Fernandez Slezak, Diego; Sigman, Mariano; Do not fear your opponent: Suboptimal changes of a prevention strategy when facing stronger opponents; American Psychological Association; Journal Of Experimental Psychology-general; 141; 3; 8-2012; 527-538  
dc.identifier.issn
0096-3445  
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/56090  
dc.description.abstract
The time spent making a decision and its quality define a widely studied trade-off. Some models suggest that the time spent is set to optimize reward, as verified empirically in simple-decision making experiments. However, in a more complex perspective compromising components of regulation focus, ambitions, fear, risk and social variables, adjustment of the speed-accuracy trade-off may not be optimal. Specifically, regulatory focus theory shows that people can be set in a promotion mode, where focus is on seeking to approach a desired state (to win), or in a prevention mode, focusing to avoid undesired states (not to lose). In promotion, people are eager to take risks increasing speed and decreasing accuracy. In prevention, strategic vigilance increases, decreasing speed and improving accuracy. When time and accuracy have to be compromised, one can ask which of these 2 strategies optimizes reward, leading to optimal performance. This is investigated here in a unique experimental environment. Decision making is studied in rapid-chess (180 s per game), in which the goal of a player is to mate the opponent in a finite amount of time or, alternatively, time-out of the opponent with sufficient material to mate. In different games, players face strong and weak opponents. It was observed that (a) players adopt a more conservative strategy when facing strong opponents, with slower and more accurate moves, and (b) this strategy is suboptimal: Players increase their winning likelihood against strong opponents using the policy they adopt when confronting opponents with similar strength. © 2011 American Psychological Association.  
dc.format
application/pdf  
dc.language.iso
eng  
dc.publisher
American Psychological Association  
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess  
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/  
dc.subject
Adaptation  
dc.subject
Chess  
dc.subject
Decision Making  
dc.subject
Response Time  
dc.subject
Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off  
dc.title
Do not fear your opponent: Suboptimal changes of a prevention strategy when facing stronger opponents  
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article  
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo  
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion  
dc.date.updated
2018-08-13T18:29:35Z  
dc.journal.volume
141  
dc.journal.number
3  
dc.journal.pagination
527-538  
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos  
dc.journal.ciudad
Washington  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Fernandez Slezak, Diego. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Física de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Física de Buenos Aires; Argentina  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Física. Laboratorio de Neurociencia Integrativa; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Física de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Física de Buenos Aires; Argentina  
dc.journal.title
Journal Of Experimental Psychology-general  
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2011-23445-001  
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025761