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dc.contributor.author Di Tella, Rafael
dc.contributor.author Perez-Truglia, Ricardo
dc.contributor.author Babino, Andrés
dc.contributor.author Sigman, Mariano
dc.date.available 2018-03-12T19:11:40Z
dc.date.issued 2015-11
dc.identifier.citation Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano; Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism; American Economic Association; American Economic Review; 105; 11; 11-2015; 3416-3442
dc.identifier.issn 0002-8282
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11336/38566
dc.description.abstract We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher American Economic Association
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject BIAS
dc.subject ALTRUISM
dc.subject CORRUPTION
dc.subject.classification Economía, Econometría
dc.subject.classification Economía y Negocios
dc.subject.classification CIENCIAS SOCIALES
dc.title Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated 2018-03-02T17:32:22Z
dc.journal.volume 105
dc.journal.number 11
dc.journal.pagination 3416-3442
dc.journal.pais Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil Fil: Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil Fil: Perez-Truglia, Ricardo. Microsoft Research; Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil Fil: Babino, Andrés. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
dc.description.fil Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
dc.journal.title American Economic Review
dc.relation.alternativeid info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
dc.relation.alternativeid info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20141409
dc.conicet.fuente Elsevier


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info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente descripción: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)