Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

dc.contributor.author
Di Tella, Rafael  
dc.contributor.author
Perez-Truglia, Ricardo  
dc.contributor.author
Babino, Andrés  
dc.contributor.author
Sigman, Mariano  
dc.date.available
2018-03-12T19:11:40Z  
dc.date.issued
2015-11  
dc.identifier.citation
Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano; Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism; American Economic Association; American Economic Review; 105; 11; 11-2015; 3416-3442  
dc.identifier.issn
0002-8282  
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/38566  
dc.description.abstract
We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).  
dc.format
application/pdf  
dc.language.iso
eng  
dc.publisher
American Economic Association  
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess  
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/  
dc.subject
Bias  
dc.subject
Altruism  
dc.subject
Corruption  
dc.subject.classification
Economía, Econometría  
dc.subject.classification
Economía y Negocios  
dc.subject.classification
CIENCIAS SOCIALES  
dc.title
Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism  
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article  
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo  
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion  
dc.date.updated
2018-03-02T17:32:22Z  
dc.journal.volume
105  
dc.journal.number
11  
dc.journal.pagination
3416-3442  
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Perez-Truglia, Ricardo. Microsoft Research; Estados Unidos  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Babino, Andrés. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina  
dc.journal.title
American Economic Review  
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409  
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20141409  

Archivos asociados
Thumbnail
 
Tamaño: 1.157Mb
Formato: PDF
.