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dc.contributor.author
Di Tella, Rafael
dc.contributor.author
Perez-Truglia, Ricardo
dc.contributor.author
Babino, Andrés
dc.contributor.author
Sigman, Mariano
dc.date.available
2018-03-12T19:11:40Z
dc.date.issued
2015-11
dc.identifier.citation
Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano; Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism; American Economic Association; American Economic Review; 105; 11; 11-2015; 3416-3442
dc.identifier.issn
0002-8282
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/38566
dc.description.abstract
We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
American Economic Association
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
Bias
dc.subject
Altruism
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Corruption
dc.subject.classification
Economía, Econometría
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Economía y Negocios
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CIENCIAS SOCIALES
dc.title
Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2018-03-02T17:32:22Z
dc.journal.volume
105
dc.journal.number
11
dc.journal.pagination
3416-3442
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil
Fil: Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil
Fil: Perez-Truglia, Ricardo. Microsoft Research; Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil
Fil: Babino, Andrés. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
dc.journal.title
American Economic Review
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20141409


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