Artículo

Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism

Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, AndrésIcon ; Sigman, MarianoIcon
Fecha de publicación: 11/2015
Editorial: American Economic Association
Revista: American Economic Review
ISSN: 0002-8282
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de recurso: Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:

Resumen

We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).
Palabras clave: Bias , Altruism , Corruption
 
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente descripción: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/38566
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20141409
Colecciones
Articulos(OCA CIUDAD UNIVERSITARIA)
Articulos de OFICINA DE COORDINACION ADMINISTRATIVA CIUDAD UNIVERSITARIA
Citación
Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andrés; Sigman, Mariano; Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism; American Economic Association; American Economic Review; 105; 11; 11-2015; 3416-3442
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