Artículo
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
Fecha de publicación:
07/2017
Editorial:
City University of New York
Revista:
Comparative Politics
ISSN:
0010-4159
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.
Palabras clave:
Authoritarian Regimes
,
Legislatures
,
Proceso
Archivos asociados
Licencia
Identificadores
Colecciones
Articulos(SEDE CENTRAL)
Articulos de SEDE CENTRAL
Articulos de SEDE CENTRAL
Citación
Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia; Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes; City University of New York; Comparative Politics; 49; 4; 7-2017; 521-539
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