Subjetividad, determinabilidad y reciprocidad en Maimon y Fichte

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to inquire into a possible implicit influence of the Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790) of Salomon Maimon on the Foundations of the Science of Knowledge (1794/95) of Johann G. Fichte. On the one hand, Fichte gives great importance to Maimon’s criticism towards the kantian separation between phenomena and thing-in-itself; on the other hand, Maimon’s skeptical challenge is a position against which Fichte reacts in his ‘94/95 work. In order to determine this influence we will focus in two specific concepts which are present in both thinker’s systems: the laws of determinability and of reciprocal determination. While Maimon grants a privilege to the first of these concepts to explain the transcendental synthesis of real thinking, Fichte favors the second one. The result is a divergence between both systems regarding their point of view on the structure of subjectivity. We will argue that Maimon remains on the cognitional reason viewpoint, from where he sees subjectivity as divided in a finite and an infinite understanding. On the contrary, Fichte’s perspective is that of practical reason, where the conflict between finite and infinite is internalized in the production of every single real determination.