Moral e interés: Una perspectiva antropológica

Otros responsables
Fecha
12/2017
Editorial
Colegio de Graduados en Antropología de la República Argentina
Revista
Publicar en Antropología y Ciencias Sociales
Título del libro
Nombre del evento
Fecha del evento
Institución organizadora
ISSN
0327-6627
eISSN
2250-7671
ISBN
Idioma
Español
Tipo del evento
Clasificación temática
Palabras clave
Resumen
El pensamiento llamado ‘occidental’ tiende sistemáticamente a trazar una oposición entre moral e interés. En este artículo, presento una aproximación teórica al análisis antropológico de las relaciones entre intereses y moral que asume un punto de partida propiamente etnográfico. Argüiré en favor de la conveniencia de tratar a la moral como un fenómeno del orden de la cognición y como un aspecto de la producción de la vida social por sujetos socialmente situados. En esos términos, es posible mostrar que la moral forma parte de los recursos cognitivos mediante los cuales los seres humanos percibimos, entendemos e intentamos concretar nuestros intereses, así como examinar etnográficamente tanto la orientación moral del comportamiento como los usos prácticos de las orientaciones morales.
The so called ‘Western’ thought systematically tends to draw an opposition between morals and interest. In this article, I present a theoretical approximation to the anthropological analysis of the relations between interests and morals that assumes an ethnographic starting point. I will argue in favour of the convenience of treating moral as a phenomenon of the order of cognition and as an aspect of the production of social life by socially situated subjects. In these terms, it is possible to show that morals is a part of the cognitive resources through which human beings perceive, understand and try to realize their interests, as well as to examine ethnographically both the moral orientation of behaviour and the practical uses of the moral orientations.
The so called ‘Western’ thought systematically tends to draw an opposition between morals and interest. In this article, I present a theoretical approximation to the anthropological analysis of the relations between interests and morals that assumes an ethnographic starting point. I will argue in favour of the convenience of treating moral as a phenomenon of the order of cognition and as an aspect of the production of social life by socially situated subjects. In these terms, it is possible to show that morals is a part of the cognitive resources through which human beings perceive, understand and try to realize their interests, as well as to examine ethnographically both the moral orientation of behaviour and the practical uses of the moral orientations.
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