A Cautionary Contribution to the Philosophy of Explanation in the Cognitive Neurosciences

Abstract

I propose a cautionary assessment of the recent debate concerning the impact of the dynamical approach on philosophical accounts of scientific explanation in the cognitive sciences and, particularly, the cognitive neurosciences. I criticize the dominant mechanistic philosophy of explanation, pointing out a number of its negative consequences: In particular, that it doesn’t do justice to the field’s diversity and stage of development, and that it fosters misguided interpretations of dynamical models’ contribution. In order to support these arguments, I analyze a case study in computational neuroethology and show why it should not be understood through a mechanistic lens; I specially focus on Zednik’s mechanistic interpretation of the case study. In addition, I argue for a greater appreciation of the relation between explanation and other epistemic goals in the field, as well as an increased sensitivity towards the associated contextual factors.