Repositorio Institucional
Repositorio Institucional
CONICET Digital
  • Inicio
  • EXPLORAR
    • AUTORES
    • DISCIPLINAS
    • COMUNIDADES
  • Estadísticas
  • Novedades
    • Noticias
    • Boletines
  • Ayuda
    • General
    • Datos de investigación
  • Acerca de
    • CONICET Digital
    • Equipo
    • Red Federal
  • Contacto
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
  • INFORMACIÓN GENERAL
  • RESUMEN
  • ESTADISTICAS
 
Artículo

Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability

Arribillaga, Roberto PabloIcon ; Jordi, Massó Carreras
Fecha de publicación: 11/2017
Editorial: American Economic Association
Revista: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
ISSN: 1945-7685
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de recurso: Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Ciencia Política

Resumen

We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set- inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
Palabras clave: Strategy-Proofness , Separable Preferences , Voting by Committees
Ver el registro completo
 
Archivos asociados
Thumbnail
 
Tamaño: 274.4Kb
Formato: PDF
.
Descargar
Licencia
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente descripción: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/65497
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160107
URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160107
Colecciones
Articulos(IMASL)
Articulos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Citación
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability; American Economic Association; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 9; 4; 11-2017; 74-107
Compartir
Altmétricas
 

Enviar por e-mail
Separar cada destinatario (hasta 5) con punto y coma.
  • Facebook
  • X Conicet Digital
  • Instagram
  • YouTube
  • Sound Cloud
  • LinkedIn

Los contenidos del CONICET están licenciados bajo Creative Commons Reconocimiento 2.5 Argentina License

https://www.conicet.gov.ar/ - CONICET

Inicio

Explorar

  • Autores
  • Disciplinas
  • Comunidades

Estadísticas

Novedades

  • Noticias
  • Boletines

Ayuda

Acerca de

  • CONICET Digital
  • Equipo
  • Red Federal

Contacto

Godoy Cruz 2290 (C1425FQB) CABA – República Argentina – Tel: +5411 4899-5400 repositorio@conicet.gov.ar
TÉRMINOS Y CONDICIONES