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dc.contributor.author
Bergantiños, Gustavo
dc.contributor.author
Massó, Jordi
dc.contributor.author
Neme, Alejandro José
dc.date.available
2018-11-26T17:27:19Z
dc.date.issued
2017-04
dc.identifier.citation
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness; Springer; Social Choice And Welfare; 48; 4; 4-2017; 857-875
dc.identifier.issn
0176-1714
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/65178
dc.description.abstract
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
Games Theory
dc.subject.classification
Otras Sociología
dc.subject.classification
Sociología
dc.subject.classification
CIENCIAS SOCIALES
dc.title
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2018-10-23T17:38:35Z
dc.journal.volume
48
dc.journal.number
4
dc.journal.pagination
857-875
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos
dc.journal.ciudad
Nuieva York
dc.description.fil
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
dc.description.fil
Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
dc.description.fil
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Social Choice And Welfare
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0


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