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dc.contributor.author
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
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dc.date.available
2018-11-23T16:16:53Z
dc.date.issued
2017-06
dc.identifier.citation
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Sellars on perceptual knowledge; Indiana University; Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society; 53; 3; 6-2017; 425-446
dc.identifier.issn
0009-1774
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/65000
dc.description.abstract
In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, after criticizing one of the forms that the Myth of the Given adopts, Sellars presents his own conception of epistemic justification. This conception, along with his criticism of the framework of the Given, has had a great impact on the analytic philosophy of the second half of twentieth century, an impact that still persists today. In this article, I aim to examine Sellars’s theory of epistemic justification in order to highlight two important problems with it. The first concerns the justification of observation reports; the second concerns the understanding of those reports. I argue that those problems do not find a suitable solution within Sellars’s theory of observational knowledge. My diagnosis is that the root cause of those problems lies in an inadequate conception of perceptual experience. This prevents Sellars from realizing the essential epistemic role that experience plays in the justification and understanding of such particular statements.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Indiana University
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
Demonstrative Reference
dc.subject
Epistemic Justification
dc.subject
John Mcdowell
dc.subject
Observation Reports
dc.subject
Perceptual Experience
dc.subject
Wilfrid Sellars
dc.subject.classification
Estudios Religiosos
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dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Ética y Religión
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dc.subject.classification
HUMANIDADES
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dc.title
Sellars on perceptual knowledge
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2018-10-19T15:36:31Z
dc.journal.volume
53
dc.journal.number
3
dc.journal.pagination
425-446
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos
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dc.journal.ciudad
Bloomington
dc.description.fil
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.53.3.04
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.53.3.04
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