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dc.contributor.author
Accinelli, Elvio
dc.contributor.author
Martins, Filipe
dc.contributor.author
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
dc.contributor.author
Pinto, Alberto
dc.contributor.author
Quintas, Luis Guillermo
dc.date.available
2018-11-22T13:16:24Z
dc.date.issued
2017-11
dc.identifier.citation
Accinelli, Elvio; Martins, Filipe; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Pinto, Alberto; Quintas, Luis Guillermo; Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption; Taylor & Francis; Journal Of Mathematical Sociology; 41; 4; 11-2017; 220-247
dc.identifier.issn
0022-250X
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/64899
dc.description.abstract
The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Taylor & Francis
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
Corruption
dc.subject
Dynamical Stability
dc.subject
Evolutionary Theory
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Game Theory
dc.subject.classification
Matemática Pura
dc.subject.classification
Matemáticas
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CIENCIAS NATURALES Y EXACTAS
dc.title
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2018-10-23T17:41:31Z
dc.journal.volume
41
dc.journal.number
4
dc.journal.pagination
220-247
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos
dc.journal.ciudad
Londres
dc.description.fil
Fil: Accinelli, Elvio. Universidad Au´onoma de San Luis Potosi; México
dc.description.fil
Fil: Martins, Filipe. Universidad de Porto; Portugal
dc.description.fil
Fil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Pinto, Alberto. Universidad de Porto; Portugal
dc.description.fil
Fil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Journal Of Mathematical Sociology
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235
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