Artículo
On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
Fecha de publicación:
03/10/2014
Editorial:
Elsevier
Revista:
Journal Of Economic Theory
ISSN:
0022-0531
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
Palabras clave:
Assignment Game
,
Core
,
Set-Wise Stability
,
Competitive Equilibrium
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Articulos(IMASL)
Articulos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Articulos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Citación
Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria; Elsevier; Journal Of Economic Theory; 154; 03-10-2014; 187-215
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