La dialéctica de razón instrumental y razón objetiva: Horkheimer y Dewey

Abstract

Me propongo revisar la relación entre Crítica de la razón instrumental y Experience and Nature. Sostendré que la polaridad entre racionalidad instrumental y objetiva no señala dos proyectos de razón alternativos y excluyentes, sino que ambas son co-constitutivas del concepto de razón desde sus orígenes. La teoría de Horkheimer presupone la posibilidad de formular una concepción afirmativa de la razón instrumental que no se identifique con la dominación social. Sin embargo, Horkheimer no despliega esta posibilidad implícita en su planteo, lo que lleva a problemas de consistencia. El pragmatismo de Dewey, con su concepción normativa del instrumento, podría coadyuvar a formular esta concepción buscada, sobre la base de una lectura mejor fundada en el texto que la del propio Horkheimer.

I intend to review the connection between Critique of Instrumental Reason and Experience and Nature. I will argue that the opposition of instrumental and objective rationality does not amount to two alternative and mutually exclusive projects of reason. Both are co-constitutive of the concept of reason since its origin. Horkheimer’s theory presupposes the possibility of an affirmative concept of instrumental reason, not entangled in social domination. However, he does not develop this implicit possibility in his approach, which in turn leads to consistency problems. Dewey’s pragmatism, with its normative conception of the instrument, could contribute to the formulation of a more differentiated concept of instrumental reason, based on a more textually-fundamented reading of his work, than that of Horkheimer himself.