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dc.contributor.author
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto  
dc.contributor.author
Shunda, Nicholas  
dc.contributor.author
Weinschelbaum, Federico  
dc.date.available
2018-02-02T20:41:51Z  
dc.date.issued
2014-05  
dc.identifier.citation
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Shunda, Nicholas; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism; AccessEcon; Economics Bulletin; 34; 1; 5-2014; 252-262  
dc.identifier.issn
1545-2921  
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/35578  
dc.description.abstract
In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue.  
dc.format
application/pdf  
dc.language.iso
eng  
dc.publisher
AccessEcon  
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess  
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/  
dc.subject
Auctions  
dc.subject
Favoritism  
dc.subject
Nondiscriminatory Mechanisms  
dc.subject.classification
Economía, Econometría  
dc.subject.classification
Economía y Negocios  
dc.subject.classification
CIENCIAS SOCIALES  
dc.title
Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism  
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article  
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo  
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion  
dc.date.updated
2018-02-01T17:01:07Z  
dc.journal.volume
34  
dc.journal.number
1  
dc.journal.pagination
252-262  
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Arozamena, Leandro Roberto. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Shunda, Nicholas. University Of Redlands; Estados Unidos  
dc.description.fil
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina  
dc.journal.title
Economics Bulletin  
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.accessecon.com/includes/CountdownloadPDF.aspx?PaperID=EB-13-00718