Looking through deep disagreements: grammatical model, persuasive clarifications, and moral disagreements

Abstract

Fogelin (1985) puts forth the notion of “deep disagreements” in the context of the discussion on informal logic and the scope and functions of argumentation. My aim is to contrast some of the assumptions that led Fogelin to a restrictive model about the uses of argumentation and deep disagreements, in order to offer an enriched alternative model. First, I will present the resolution model based on some of Fogelin’s ideas: those in disagreement are interested in resolving differences; arguments play the role of rational resolution by offering compelling grounds; persuasion is not part of the rational argumentative practices of resolution. Second, I will offer a Wittgenstein-inspired alternative, the grammatical model. This model is advantageous for distinguishing between different functions of disagreements -many of which do not seek resolution. This allows me to postulate the idea of open disagreements. The model also points out the diverse purposes that argumentative practices can play, some of which include persuasion. The latter makes it possible to introduce the notion of persuasive clarifications as rational argumentative practices that help us to see differences. Finally, I will propose that, in the contexts of moral disagreements, these clarifications more clearly show the world-picture that upholds our positions and encourage us to change the way of seeing and understanding the moral issue under discussion.