Constructivism or Epistemic Advantage, But Not Both: (Not) Solving the Circularity Problem

Abstract

Can we maintain that all knowledge is relative to specific frameworks (such as socially situated standpoints) while also claiming that some frameworks are better than others? This tension risks either circularity— privileging a standpoint by its own standards—or inconsistency, by invoking a non-situated vantage point. Ashton and McKenna propose a solution: some achievements, though rooted in one standpoint, can be evaluated using criteria shared across standpoints. They suggest that members of certain groups may improve scientific practice by reshaping conceptions of evidence, thus enabling better hypotheses to be seen as justified. Crucially, “better” here is not defined by the standpoint in question but by cross-standpoint standards. However, their account relies on a constructivist view of justification, where group influence alters what counts as evidence. This opposes objectivist views and creates a problem: if a hypothesis is “better” by broadly accepted standards (simplicity, explanatory and predictive power), then it should have always been justified. It is unclear how its status changed merely due to social input. We conclude that defending the kind of Epistemic Advantage Thesis Ashton and McKenna endorse ultimately requires rejecting constructivism about justification.