Have Private Supermarket Norms Benefited Laborers?: Lemon and Sweet Citrus Production in Argentina

Abstract

It has been argued that the high cost of phytosanitary requirements in northern countries and of the certification by commercial chains negatively affect the earnings of laborers. It has also been argued that a system of private certifications will encroach upon the functions of the state. Using the case study of two citrus industries in Argentina, a middle income country, we show that these two assumptions do not always hold. In the two cases reviewed here, field laborers profited from good agricultural practices and from the more orderly managerial practices that certifiers demanded. Producers also re-evaluated the transaction costs of cheap labor practices after they became aware of the importance of responsible performance. But producers agreed grant wage increases only after the unions threatened to strike. It did not, however, pull laborers out of poverty since in counter-seasonal horticultural export industries the period of employment is usually short.