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dc.contributor.author
Pereira, Jose Roberto Gabriel
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dc.date.available
2024-07-05T12:59:18Z
dc.date.issued
2022-04
dc.identifier.citation
Pereira, Jose Roberto Gabriel; Judges as equilibrists: Explaining judicial activism in Latin America; Oxford University Press; International Journal of Constitutional Law; 20; 2; 4-2022; 696-732
dc.identifier.issn
1474-2659
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/239195
dc.description.abstract
Intense forms of judicial activism have emerged in Latin American in the last three decades. Judges dictated Structural Remedies Decisions (SRDs) ordering to create, design, and implement public policies to redress structural human rights violations; and implementing permanent judicial monitoring of the policy process. In a region marked by judicial instability, SRDs are risky options for judges. They can be seen as strong challenges to government and, thus, prompt retaliation. They can also damage judges´ reputation as they might be strongly criticized by influential conservative groups of society opposing progressive structural reforms.What drives judges to pursue or avoid this kind of risky activism? I propose the Equilibrist Approach, an alternative model to standard accounts explaining judicial behavior in Latin America. It incorporates the legitimacy building dimension of the strategic game and predicts some level of assertiveness, but one that is careful about elites´ preferences and those of the mass public and opinion leaders. I use the institutional fragile Argentine Supreme Court to test the model, as it decided several SDRs in the early 2000s.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Oxford University Press
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dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
JUDICIAL POLITICS
dc.subject
PUBLIC LAW
dc.subject
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
dc.subject
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
dc.subject.classification
Otras Derecho
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dc.subject.classification
Derecho
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dc.subject.classification
CIENCIAS SOCIALES
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dc.title
Judges as equilibrists: Explaining judicial activism in Latin America
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2024-07-05T11:49:06Z
dc.journal.volume
20
dc.journal.number
2
dc.journal.pagination
696-732
dc.journal.pais
Reino Unido
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dc.description.fil
Fil: Pereira, Jose Roberto Gabriel. Universidad Nacional de Tucuman. Facultad de Derecho y Cs.sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Tucumán; Argentina
dc.journal.title
International Journal of Constitutional Law
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/20/2/696/6658108
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moac044
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