Cooperation and Defection at the Crossroads

Abstract

We study a simple traffic model with a non-signalized road intersection. In this model the car arriving from the right has precedence. The vehicle dynamics far from the crossing are governed by the rules introduced by Nagel and Paczuski, which define how drivers behave when braking or accelerating. We measure the average velocity of the ensemble of cars and its flow as a function of the density of cars on the roadway. An additional set of rules is defined to describe the dynamics at the intersection assuming a fraction of drivers that do not obey the rule of precedence. This problem is treated within a gametheory framework, where the drivers that obey the rule are cooperators and those who ignore it are defectors. We study the consequences of these behaviors as a function of the fraction of cooperators and defectors. The results show that cooperation is the best strategy because it maximizes the flow of vehicles and minimizes the number of accidents. A rather paradoxical effect is observed: for any percentage of defectors the number of accidents is larger when the density of cars is low because of the higher average velocity.