Procesos de restabilización en modelos de asignación bilateral

Abstract

Two-sided matching models have been widely used in labor markets and in school selection programs. The agents of a matching model are divided into two disjoint subsets, for example firms and workers. Each worker has an order of preference (salary, working conditions) over the firms, while these order their acceptable workers according to any suitability criterion to carry out the task. A result is one assignment of workers to the firm. One of the most important properties that any matching model solution must fulfill is stability. Great progress has been achieved in centralized markets using two-sided matching models, where a central entity produc-es stable matchings using variations of the Deferred Acceptance algo-rithm. In this work we extend the theory in a frame where it can be used in decentralized labor markets. We show how a market can have its stability back after a stable matching is decentralized by the leaving of some work-ers or the entrance of new firms.