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dc.contributor.author
Clerici, Paula Andrea
dc.contributor.author
Demeco, Lucía
dc.contributor.author
Galeano, Franco
dc.contributor.author
Negri, Juan Pablo
dc.date.available
2023-12-19T11:32:28Z
dc.date.issued
2023-09
dc.identifier.citation
Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri, Juan Pablo; Mudding the playing field. Fiscal contributions to municipalities as a political construction; Wiley; Governance; 9-2023; 1-22
dc.identifier.issn
1468-0491
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/220725
dc.description.abstract
In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997–2000 and 2016–2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor's political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Wiley
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
FISCAL FEDERALISM
dc.subject
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
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DISCRETIONARY TRANSFERS
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FEDERALISM
dc.subject.classification
Ciencia Política
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Ciencia Política
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CIENCIAS SOCIALES
dc.title
Mudding the playing field. Fiscal contributions to municipalities as a political construction
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2023-12-15T14:03:51Z
dc.journal.pagination
1-22
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil
Fil: Clerici, Paula Andrea. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Demeco, Lucía. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Galeano, Franco. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Negri, Juan Pablo. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Governance
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12820
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