Evento

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

Arribillaga, Roberto PabloIcon ; Neme, Alejandro JoséIcon ; Massó, Jordi
Tipo del evento: Congreso
Nombre del evento: VIII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Fecha del evento: 03/05/2021
Institución Organizadora: Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada Computacional e Industrial;
Título de la revista: Proceedings of VIII MACI 2021
Editorial: Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada Computacional e Industrial
ISSN: 2314-3282
Idioma: Inglés
Clasificación temática:

Resumen

For division problems with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barbera, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Palabras clave: OBVIOUS STRATEGY-PROOFNESS , SEQUENTIAL ALLOTMENT RULES , DIVISION PROBLEMS
 
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente descripción: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/219846
URL: https://asamaci.org.ar/revista-maci/
URL: https://asamaci.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/MACI-Vol-8-2021.pdf
Colecciones
Eventos(IMASL)
Eventos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Citación
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof; VIII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2021; 429-432
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