Evento
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
Tipo del evento:
Congreso
Nombre del evento:
VIII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Fecha del evento:
03/05/2021
Institución Organizadora:
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada Computacional e Industrial;
Título de la revista:
Proceedings of VIII MACI 2021
Editorial:
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada Computacional e Industrial
ISSN:
2314-3282
Idioma:
Inglés
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
For division problems with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barbera, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Archivos asociados
Licencia
Identificadores
Colecciones
Eventos(IMASL)
Eventos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Eventos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Citación
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof; VIII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2021; 429-432
Compartir