Artículo
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
Fecha de publicación:
03/2022
Editorial:
Elsevier
Revista:
Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN:
0899-8256
e-ISSN:
1090-2473
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
We study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings for a many-to-many matching market. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two natural binary operations for computing the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for each side of the matching market. Then we prove that with these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two distributive lattices for the appropriate partial order, one for each side of the market. Moreover, these lattices are dual.
Archivos asociados
Licencia
Identificadores
Colecciones
Articulos(IMASL)
Articulos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Articulos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Citación
Juarez, Noelia Mariel; Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 132; 3-2022; 255-273
Compartir
Altmétricas